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Duringthelastfewyears,muchresearchhasbeendevotedtostrategicinteractionsoncomplexnetworks.In
this context, the Prisoner’s Dilemma has become a paradigmatic model, and it has been established that
imitative evolutionary dynamics lead to very different outcomes depending on the details of the network.
We here report that when one takes into account the real behavior of people observed in the experiments,
both at the mean-fieldleveland onutterly different networks, the observed level of cooperation is the same.
We thus show that when human subjects interact in a heterogeneous mix including cooperators, defectors
and moody conditional cooperators, the structure of the population does not promote or inhibit
cooperation with respect to a well mixed population.
I
nrecent years, the physics ofcomplex systemshas wideneditsscope byconsidering interacting many-particle
modelswheretheinteractiongoesbeyondtheusualconceptofforce.Onesuchlineofresearchthathasproven
particularly interesting is evolutionary game theory on graphs
1,2, in which interaction between agents is given
by a game while their own state is described by a strategy subject to an evolutionary process
3,4. A game that has
attracted a lot of attention in this respect is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
5,6, a model of a situation in which
cooperative actionslead tothe bestoutcomein social terms,but where free riders ornon-cooperative individuals
canbenefitthe mostindividually. Inmathematical terms,thisisdescribed byapayoffmatrix (entries correspond
to the row player’s payoffs and C and D are respectively the cooperative and non-cooperative actions)
CD
C1S
DT0
ð1Þ
with T . 1 (temptation to free-ride) and S , 0 (detriment in cooperating when the other does not).
In a pioneering work, Nowak and May
7 showed that the behavior observed in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
wasdramatically different on alatticethaninamean-field approach:Indeed, onalatticethe cooperative strategy
wasabletoprevailbyformingclustersofalikeagentswhooutcompeteddefection.Subsequently,theproblemwas
considered in literally hundreds of papers
1,8–11, and very many differences between structured and well-mixed
(mean-field) populations were identified, although by no means they were always in favor of cooperation
12,13.I n
fact, it has been recently realized that this problem is very sensitive to the details of the system
2,14, in particular to
the type of evolutionary dynamics
15 considered. For this reason experimental input is needed in order to reach a
sound conclusion about what has been referred to as ‘network reciprocity’.
Here, we show that using the outcome from the experimental evidence to inform theoretical models, the
behavior of agents playing a PD is the same at the mean field level and in very different networks. To this end,
insteadofconsideringsomeadhocimitativedynamics
7,16,17,ourplayerswillplayaccordingtothestrategyrecently
uncoveredbyGrujic ´etal.
18inthelargestexperimentreportedtodateabouttherepeatedspatialPD,carriedouton
a lattice as in Nowak and May’s paper
7 with parameters T 5 1.43 and S 5 0.
The results of the experiment were novel in several respects. First, the population of players exhibited a rather
low level of cooperation (fraction of cooperative actions in every round of the game in the steady state), hereafter
denoted byÆcæ.Most important, however,wasthe unraveling ofthe structure ofthe strategies.The analysisof the
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consisting of ‘‘mostly defectors’’ (defected with probability larger
than 0.8), a few ‘‘mostly cooperators’’ (cooperated with probability
larger than 0.8), and a majority of so-called moody conditional
cooperators. This last group consisted of players that switched
from cooperation to defection with probability PDC
i ~1{d{cci
~1{PCC
i and from defection to cooperation with probability
PCD
i ~azbci~1{PDD
i , ci being the fraction of cooperative actions
in player i’s neighborhood in the previous iteration. Conditional
cooperation, i.e., the dependence of the chosen strategy on the
amount of cooperation received, had been reported earlier in related
experiments
19 and observed also for the spatial repeated PD at a
smaller scale
20. The new ingredient revealed in Grujic ´ et al.’s experi-
ment
18 was the dependence of the behavior on the own player’s
previous action, hence the reason to call them ‘‘moody’’.
Results
To study how the newly unveiled rules influence the emergence of
cooperation in an structured population of individuals, we first
report results from numerical simulations of a system made up of
N 5 10
4 individuals who play a repeated PD game according to the
experimentalobservations.Tothisend,weexploredtheaveragelevel
ofcooperationinfourdifferentnetworkconfigurations:awell-mixed
population in which the probability that a player interacts with any
other one is the same for all players, a square lattice, an Erdo ¨s-Renyi
(ER) graph and a Baraba ´si-Albert (BA) scale-free (SF) network. It is
worth mentioning that the dependence on the payoff matrix only
enters through the parameters describing the players’ behavior (d, c,
a, b and the fractions of the three types of players). Once these
parameters are fixed the payoffs do not enter anywhere in the evolu-
tion, as this is only determined by the variables ci, the local fractions
ofcooperativeactionswithineachplayer’sneighborhood.Thusthere
isnopossibility toexplorethedependence onthepayoffsbecausewe
lack a connection between them and the behavioral parameters.
In Figure 1 we present our most striking result. The figure repre-
sents, in a color-coded scale, the average level of cooperation as a
function of the fraction of mostly cooperators, rC, and mostly defec-
tors,rD,foraBAnetworkofcontacts.Thesameplotsbutfortherest
oftopologiesexplored(latticeandERgraphs)produceindistinguish-
able results with respect to those shown in the figure. We therefore
conclude that the average level of cooperation in the system does not
depend on the underlying structure. This means that, under the
assumption that the players follow the behavior of Grujic ´ et al’s
experiment
18, there is no network reciprocity, i.e., no matter what
the network of contacts looks like, the observed level of cooperation
is the same. This latter finding is in stark contrast to most previous
results coming out from numerical simulations of models in which
many different updating rules —all of them based upon the relative
payoffs obtained by the players— have been explored.
Mean-field Approach. The previous numerical findings can be
recovered using a simple mean-field approach to the problem. Let
thefractionsofthethreetypesofplayersberC,rDandrX,formostly
cooperators, mostly defectors, and moody conditional cooperators,
respectively, with the obvious constraint rX 5 1 2 rD 2 rC.
Denoting by Pt(A) the cooperation probability at time t for
strategy A(5 C, D, X) of the repeated PD we have
c hi t~rCPC ðÞ zrDPD ðÞ zrXPt X ðÞ , ð2Þ
where Pt(C) 5 P(C) and Pt(D) 5 P(D) are known constants [in our
case P(C) 5 0.8, P(D) 5 0.2]. The probability of cooperation for
conditional players in the next time step can be obtained as
Ptz1 X ðÞ ~ dzc c hi t
  
Pt X ðÞ z azb c hi t
  
1{Pt X ðÞ ½  , ð3Þ
where the first term in the right hand side considers the probability
that a conditional cooperator keeps playing as a cooperator, whereas
the second terms stands for the situation in which a moody
conditional cooperator switched from defection to cooperation.
Asymptotically
lim
t??Pt X ðÞ ~PX ðÞ , lim
t?? c hi t~ c hi :
From Eq. (3),
PX ðÞ ~
azb c hi
1za{dz b{c ðÞ c hi
, ð4Þ
thus (2) implies (with the replacement rX 5 1 2 rC 2 rD)
ArCzBrD~1, ð5Þ
where
A:
PC ðÞ {PX ðÞ
c hi {PX ðÞ
, B:
PD ðÞ {PX ðÞ
c hi {PX ðÞ
, ð6Þ
arefunctionsofÆcæ.FromEq.(5)itfollowsthatthecurvesofconstant
Æcæarestraightlinesinthesimplex.Figure1clearlydemonstratesthis
fact:Thestraight linesareplotsofEq.(5)fordifferentvaluesofÆcæ.It
can be seen that they are parallel to the color stripes, and that the
values of Æcæ they correspond to accurately fit those of the simula-
tions. Figure 2 depicts the curve Æcæ vs. rC for two different values of
rD, as obtained from Eq. (5) and compared to simulations. This
figure illustrates the excellent quantitative agreement between the
mean-field result and the simulation results. The match between
the analytical and numerical results is remarkable, as it is the fact
that this agreement does not depend on the underlying topology.
This is the ultimate consequence of the lack of network reciprocity:
thecooperation levelon anynetwork canbeaccurately modeled as if
individuals were playing in a well-mixed population.
Figure 1 | Dependence of the average level of cooperation on the density
of strategists. Density plot of Æcæ, as a function of the fractions of the three
strategies (mostly cooperators, C, mostly defectors, D, and moody
conditional cooperators, X). The plot corresponds to a Baraba ´si-Albert
network of contacts (Ækæ 5 6), but the corresponding plot for an Erdo ¨s-
Renyi graph or a regular lattice is indistinguishable from this one. The
systemismadeupofN510
4playersandtherestofparameters,takenfrom
Ref.18,are:d50.38,a50.15,c50.62,b520.1.Thethinlinesrepresent
the mean-field estimations [c.f. Eq. (5)] for Æcæ 5 0.32, 0.44, 0.56, 0.68.
They very accurately match the contour lines of the density plot
correspondingtothosevaluesofÆcæ,thusprovingthatthesameoutcomeis
obtained in a complete graph (mean-field). Simulation results have been
averaged over 200 realizations.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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strated in Figure 3. This figure compares the approach of the coop-
eration level to its stationary state as obtained iterating Eq. (3) and
from numerical simulations on different networks with different
sizes. The initial cooperation level has been set to Æcæ0 5 0.592, close
to the value observed in Grujic ´ et al’s experiment
18. The transient
does exhibit a weak dependence on the underlying topology and
specially on the network size, but for the largest simulated size (N
5 10
4) the curves are all very close to the mean-field prediction.
Distributionof Payoffs.The onlyobservable onwhich the topology
does have a strong effect is the payoff distribution among players.
Figure 4 shows these distributions for the three studied topologies,
and at two different times —short and long. Smooth at short times,
this distribution peaks around certain values at long times. This
reflects the fact that payoffs depend on the number of neighbors of
different types around a given player, which yields a finite set of
values for the payoffs (the centers of the peaks). These numbers
occur with different probabilities (determining the height of the
peaks), according to the distribution
Q k ðÞ ~
X
k§1
k
kC kD
  
r
kC
C r
kD
D r
kX
X pk ðÞ , ð7Þ
where p(k) is the degree distribution of the network and k 5 (kC, kD,
kX), but it is understood that kX 5 k 2 kC 2 kD. The stan-
dard convention is assumed that the multinomial coefficient
k
kC kD
  
~0 whenever kC , 0, kD , 0o rkX , 0.
The approach to a stationary distribution of payoffs exhibits a
much longer transient. This is due to the fluctuations in the payoffs
arising from the specific actions (cooperate or defect) taken by the
players. These fluctuations damp out as the accumulated payoffs
approach their asymptotic values. Thus, the peak widths shrink pro-
portionally to t
21/2. In fact, one can show that the probability density
for the distribution of payoffs P for strategy Z can be approximated
as
WZ P ðÞ ~
X
k
G P{ak Z ðÞ m k ðÞ ,
ﬃﬃ
t
p
ak Z ðÞ s k ðÞ
  
Q k ðÞ , ð8Þ
where Gx ,c ðÞ : 2pc2 ðÞ
{1=2e{x2=2c2
, the mean payoff per neighbor
received by a Z strategist against a cooperator is
ak Z ðÞ :
1
k
PZ ðÞ zT 1{PZ ðÞ ½  fg ,
with k 5 kC 1 kD 1 kX, and the average cooperation level in the
neighborhood of the focal player and its variance are
Figure 2 | Absence of Network Reciprocity. Average cooperation level in
the stationary state, Æcæ, as a function of the density rC of mostly
cooperators and two different values of the density rD of mostly defectors,
for two different kinds of networks: regular lattice (k 5 8), and Baraba ´si-
Albert network (Ækæ 5 8). The network size is N 5 10
4 and the rest of
parameters are as in Figure 1. Lines represent the mean-field estimations.
Results are averages over 200 realizations. The inset is a zoom that
highlights how the different curves compare.
Figure 3 | Asymptotic level of Cooperation. Time evolution of the
cooperationleveluntilthestationarystateisreached.Theresultshavebeen
obtained from numerical simulations on different networks with different
sizes. The Mean-Field curve is the solution of Eq. (3). P(C) 5 2/3, P(D) 5
1/3,P(X;t50)51,Ækæ58,rD50.586,rC50.053,d50.345,a50.224,
c 5 0.64, b 52 0.072. Averages have been taken over 10
3 realizations.
Figure 4 | Payoff Distributions. Distribution of the pay-off per neighbor
in the stationary state for different network topologies: regular lattice (k 5
8),Erdo ¨sRe ´nyi(Ækæ58)andBaraba ´si-Albertnetwork(Ækæ58).Blackand
blue lines represent the results of numerical simulations for two values of
time: t 5 10 (black shallow curves) and t 5 10
4 (blue, thick line curves)
while red lines represent the theoretical estimations at t 5 10
4, as obtained
fromEq.(8).N510
4,rD50.586,rC50.053,andotherparametersareas
in Figure 1. The simulation results are averages over 10
3 realizations.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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s k ðÞ
2:kCPC ðÞ 1{PC ðÞ ½  zkDPD ðÞ 1{PD ðÞ ½ 
zkXPX ðÞ 1{PX ðÞ ½  :
The approximate total payoff distribution, W(P) 5 rCWC(P) 1
rDWD(P) 1 rXWX(P), is compared in Figure 4 with the results of
the simulations for the longest time.
Discussion
Inthisworkwehaveshownbothanalyticallyandthroughnumerical
simulationsthatifwetakeintoaccountthewayinwhichhumansare
experimentally found to behave when facing social dilemmas on
lattices,noevidence ofnetworkreciprocity isobtained. Inparticular,
we have argued that if the players of a Prisoners’ Dilemma adopt an
update rule that only depends on what they see from their neighbor-
hood, then cooperation drops to a low level —albeit nonzero— irre-
spective of the underlying network. Moreover, we have shown that
the average level of cooperation obtained from simulations is very
well predicted by a mean-field model, and it is found to depend only
on the fractions of different strategists. Additionally, we have also
shownthattheunderlyingnetworkofcontactsdoesmanifestitselfin
the distribution of payoffs obtained by the players, and has a slight
influence on the transient behavior.
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that our results only make
sense when applied to evolutionary game models aimed at mimick-
ing human behavior in social dilemmas. The independence on the
topology seems to reflect the fact that humans update their ac-
tions according to a rule that ignores relative payoffs. Interestingly,
absence of network reciprocity has also been observed in numerical
simulations using best response dynamics
21, an update rule widely
used in economics that does not take into account the neighbors’s
payoffs. This suggests that the result that networks do not play any
role in the repeated PD may be general for any dynamics that does
not take neighbors’ payoffs into account. We want to stress that the
samekindofmodelsthoughtofinastrictbiologicalcontextareruled
by completely different mechanisms which do take into account
payoff (fitness) differences. Therefore, in such contexts lattice reci-
procity does play its role. In any case, our results call for further
experimentsthatuncoverwhatrulesareactuallygoverningthebeha-
vior of players engaged in this and other social dilemmas.
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